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Abstract 
Most analyses of social protection are focussed on public arrangements. However, social effort is 
not restricted to the public domain; all kinds of private arrangements can be substitutes to public 
programs. In fact, in several countries there has been a shift from public towards private social 
arrangements. OECD-data indicate that accounting for private social benefits has an equalising 
effect on levels of social effort across a number of countries. This suggests that public and private 
social expenditures are complementary to some extent. But their distributional effects differ. In all 
OECD countries, the social protection system causes a more equal distribution of incomes. Indeed, 
using cross-country data, we find a negative relationship between public social expenditures and 
income inequality and a positive relationship between public social expenditure and income 
redistribution. But we do not find a significant positive relationship between private social 
expenditures and income inequality or income redistribution. Consequently, changes in the 
public/private-mix in the provision of social protection may affect the redistributive impact of the 
welfare state. 
 
JEL-classification: D3, H22, and H55 
Keywords: Social Protection, Private Social Expenditure, Income Distribution 
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1  Introduction 
 
The welfare state aims to reduce income inequality between individuals. People differ in their talent, 
socio-economic background and opportunities. The market process then results in large differences in 
income levels. Governments achieve interpersonal redistribution of market incomes through taxes 
and social benefits (cash benefits and benefits in kind). In recent years considerable progress has 
been made in empirical research on the impact of social protection systems on income inequality. But 
most analyses of social protection are focussed on public arrangements. However, social effort is 
not restricted to the public domain; all kinds of private arrangements can be substitutes to public 
programs. The OECD has recently done a comprehensive study on public and private social 
expenditure (Adema, 2001; Adema and Ledaique, 2005). They define private programs as ‘social’ 
when they serve a social purpose, are subject to government intervention and contain an element 
of interpersonal redistribution. The data gathered by the OECD show that such private social 
arrangements have a substantial size in many countries. In fact, in several countries welfare state 
reforms have caused a shift from public towards private social expenditures. Our question is 
whether such a shift from public to private social arrangements affects the redistributive impact of 
the welfare state. Theoretically, it is plausible that public and private arrangements in social 
protection systems have dissimilar distributional effects. In this paper, we will empirically investigate 
the relationship, if any, between cross-country differences in public and private social expenditure 
and the distribution of income in a number of wealthy nations. To that end, we will use more recent 
data on private social expenditure than in earlier work (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2005). We 
analyse the effects of accounting for private social benefits on social protection statistics, and link 
both public social spending and private social spending to indicators of income inequality and income 
redistribution. Our purpose is to present a simple and intuitive analysis which elaborates on previous 
work. The aim of the paper is not to explain the household income distribution across countries, nor 
will we discuss the direction of the causality of the relationship between cross-country differences in 
income inequality and the levels of social spending. Such an analysis should be based on a theory 
which would have to address several cross-national differences explaining the household income 
distribution (cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). Such a comprehensive approach is far beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
This contribution is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises empirical results of the level of 
income inequality and income redistribution through the welfare state across countries. In section 3 
we discuss the nature of private social expenditures and show recent data on these expenditures. In 
section 4 we perform several empirical analyses on public and private social expenditures, and the 
distribution of income. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2  Empirical evidence on income inequality and income redistribution  
 
The best cross-nationally comparable collection of income data is the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS). LIS was created specifically to improve consistency across countries. The LIS data are a 
collection of micro data-sets obtained from a range of income surveys in various countries. The 
advantage of these data is that extensive efforts have been made by country specialists to make 
information on income and household characteristics as comparable as possible across a large 
number of countries. The approach adopted by LIS overcomes most, but not all, of the problems of 
making comparisons across countries that plagued earlier studies (Smeeding, 2002).  
This section summarises the evidence on cross national comparisons of income inequality over 29 
nations based on empirical evidence from LIS (Mahler and Jesuit, 2006). Levels of inequality can be 
shown in several ways, e.g. by Lorenz curves, specific points on the percentile distribution (P10 or 
P90), decile ratios (P90/P10), and Gini coefficients or many other summary statistics of inequality. 
All (summary) statistics of inequality can be used to rank income inequality in OECD countries, but 
they do not always tell the same story. The obvious advantage of the presentation of inequality by 
summary statistics is its ability to summarise several nations in one picture. 
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Figure 1 shows the most often used summary measure of the income distribution - the Gini 
coefficient of equivalized disposable income. The Gini coefficient lies between 0 (no inequality and 
1 (maximum inequality). The figure indicates that a wide range of inequality of disposable income 
exists across developed nations, with the nation with the highest inequality coefficient (Mexico) 
over twice as high as the nation with the lowest coefficient (Denmark). In another study (Caminada 
and Goudswaard, 2001) we have shown that income inequality has risen since the early 1980’s in 
the majority of the OECD countries, although it is wrong to think in terms of a world-wide trend 
(Atkinson, 2000). 
 
Figure 1: Gini index of equivalized disposable income 
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
D
en
m
ar
k 
1
9
9
2
S
lo
va
k 
R
ep
. 
1
9
9
6
Fi
n
la
n
d
 2
0
0
0
N
e
th
e
rl
an
d
s 
1
9
9
9
N
or
w
ay
 2
0
0
0
S
w
ed
en
 2
0
0
0
G
er
m
a
n
y 
2
0
0
0
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
. 
1
9
9
6
Lu
xe
m
b
ou
rg
 2
0
0
0
A
u
st
ri
a
 2
0
0
0
B
e
lg
iu
m
 2
0
0
0
Fr
an
ce
 1
9
9
4
Po
la
n
d
 1
9
9
9
C
an
a
d
a 
2
0
0
0
S
p
ai
n
 1
9
9
0
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
 1
9
9
2
A
u
st
ra
lia
 1
9
9
4
Ir
e
la
n
d
 2
0
0
0
It
al
y 
2
0
0
0
U
K
 1
9
9
9
U
S
A
 2
0
0
0
M
ex
ic
o
 2
0
0
2
O
E
C
D
-2
2
 
Source: Brandolini and Smeeding (2005); data to be found at www.lisproject.org/ 
 
 
But what is the impact of welfare states on inequality? Smeeding (2002) showed that social policies, 
wage distributions, time worked, social and labour market institutions and demographic differences 
all have some influence on why there are large differences in inequality among rich nations at any 
point in time. However, in this paper we focus on social protection systems only.  
Most nations have designed systems of social protection to shield their citizens against the risk of a 
fall in economic status due to unemployment, divorce, disability, retirement, and death of a 
spouse. But these social protection systems also aim to reduce inequality between individuals and 
households. The substantial differences in income inequality across welfare democracies are well 
documented (e.g. Förster, 2000; Atkinson et al, 1995; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Förster 
and d'Ercole 2005). These differences are often attributed to social policies. Förster’s empirical 
analyses showed that in most developed countries, between one third and 45 percent of all public 
transfers goes to the lower incomes. Korpi and Palme (1998), for example, showed that welfare 
states with generous social insurance programs redistribute economic resources more effectively 
and have a more equal distribution of incomes than welfare states with less generous insurance 
schemes. In general, tax/transfer systems as a whole reduce market-income inequality in all OECD 
countries.  
 
Usually the impact of social policy on the distributions of income is calculated in line with the work 
of Musgrave, Case and Leonard (1974), i.e. statutory or budget incidence analysis. That is, 
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important issues of tax/transfer shifting and behavioural responses are ignored.1 The measure of 
the redistributive impact of social protection on inequality is straightforwardly based on formulas 
developed by Kakwani (1986) and Ringen (1991): 
  
Redistribution by government = (primary income – disposable income) / (primary income) x 100. 
 
Figure 2 shows the reduction in inequality caused by social protection, where primary income 
inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, pre-transfer market incomes and disposable 
income inequality is given by the same summary statistic of disposable equivalent incomes. The 
figure shows the Gini income inequality before and after taxes/transfers and the inequality 
reduction coefficient in 22 countries around the year 2000. Taxes and transfers reduce the Gini by 
on average 26 percent. For example Sweden, Denmark and Germany achieve a greater 
redistribution of economic resources (more than 40 percent) compared to Canada, Spain, 
Switzerland and the United States. It turns out that the latter countries are in fact those with the 
least equality, while Sweden, Denmark, and Norway are countries with a rather low degree of 
income inequality.  
 
Figure 2: Gini indices of market income and equivalized disposable income 
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Gini Disposable Income Effect Transfers and Taxes
 
Source: Brandolini and Smeeding (2005); data to be found at www.lisproject.org/ 
 
 
However, the results in Figure 2 do not show the redistributive impact of separate parts of social 
protection systems. Recent literature suggests that the determination of the relationship between 
social expenditures and inequality should be carried out on a disaggregated basis (see Swabisch et 
al, 2003). Ferrarini and Nelson (2002) showed that only a limited number of studies have attempted 
to specify the link between specific social transfer programs and income inequality. Thereby, the 
knowledge about the institutional structures that produce certain distributive outcomes is limited. 
Especially earlier studies that decompose inequality into specific transfers do not pay sufficient 
                                                 
1 See for a critical survey of efforts to measure budget incidence by Smolensky et al. (1987). However, models 
that include e.g. behavioral links are beyond the scope of existing empirical work (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 
1998, p. 3). Therefore, researchers have restricted themselves largely to accounting exercises which 
decompose changes in overall inequality into a set of components.  
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attention to the problem of taxation of social insurance. To gain a deeper understanding of the 
redistributive mechanisms of the welfare state it is necessary to disaggregate the social transfer 
system into program specific components. Recent LIS data (Mahler and Jesuit, 2006) show a rough 
disaggregation for a number of countries. Table 1 indicates that on average 24 percent of the 
redistributive impact of the welfare state can be attributed to taxes and 76 percent to transfers. 
However, the differences between countries are quite large: in the US 40 percent of redistribution 
comes from taxes, while in Switzerland taxes account for only 2 percent of total redistribution and 
transfers for 98 percent. At the program level, pensions have by far the strongest redistributive 
impact. More than half of the redistributive impact of social transfers comes from pensions. 
Unemployment programs do not contribute very substantially to income redistribution, while other 
programs (disability, health insurance, and social assistance) account on average for 30 percent of 
total redistribution in the countries presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Gini indices of private sector and disposable incomes and fiscal redistribution 
 
Country 
Gini  
private 
income 
Gini index 
disposable 
income 
Fiscal 
Redistribution 
From 
taxes 
From 
transfers 
From 
pensions 
From 
unemp. 
From 
other 
Australia 2003 0.460 0.312 32.2% 32% 68% 22% 5% 41% 
Belgium 1997 0.481 0.250 48.0% 32% 68% 46% 10% 12% 
Canada 2000 0.429 0.315 26.6% 35% 65% 33% 5% 26% 
Denmark 2004 0.419 0.228 45.6% 22% 78% 35% 8% 36% 
Finland 2004 0.463 0.252 45.6% 22% 78% 43% 6% 29% 
France 1994 0.485 0.288 40.6% 9% 91% 59% 8% 24% 
Germany 2000 0.473 0.275 41.9% 25% 75% 53% 5% 17% 
Ireland 1987 0.500 0.328 34.4% 26% 74% 12% 10% 52% 
Netherlands 1999 0.372 0.231 37.9% 31% 69% 36% 2% 30% 
Norway 2000 0.403 0.251 37.7% 26% 74% 37% 3% 35% 
Sweden 2000 0.447 0.252 43.6% 19% 81% 39% 10% 32% 
Switzerland 2002 0.392 0.274 30.1% 2% 98% 81% 4% 14% 
UK 1999 0.498 0.343 31.1% 20% 80% 27% 1% 52% 
USA 2004 0.481 0.372 22.7% 40% 60% 33% 2% 25% 
          
Mean 0.450 0.284 37.0% 24% 76% 40% 6% 30% 
 
Source: LIS data based on Mahler and Jesuit (2006); updated data are available at: 
http://www.lisproject.org/publications/fiscalredistdata/fiscred.htm; and own calculations 
 
 
3  Private social expenditures 
 
The OECD defines social expenditures as ‘the provision by public and private institutions of benefits 
to, and financial contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support 
during circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the 
benefits and financial contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or 
service nor an individual contract or transfer’ (OECD 2007, p. 6). Since only benefits provided by 
institutions are included in the social expenditure definition, transfers between households - albeit 
of a social nature - are not in the social domain. Social benefits include cash benefits (e.g. pensions, 
income support during maternity leave, and social assistance payments), social services (e.g. 
childcare, care for the elderly and disabled) and tax breaks with a social purpose (e.g. tax 
expenditures towards families with children, or favourable tax treatment of contributions to private 
health plans). 
There are two main criteria which have to be simultaneously satisfied for an expenditure item to be 
classified as social: 1) the benefits have to be intended to address one or more social purposes; and 
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2) programs regulating the provision of benefits have to involve either inter-personal redistribution, 
or compulsory participation.  
The distinction between public and private social protection is made on the basis of whoever controls 
the relevant financial flows; public institutions or private bodies. 
Within the group of private social benefits, two broad categories can be distinguished: mandatory and 
voluntary private social expenditure. Mandatory private social expenditure is social support stipulated 
by legislation but operated through the private sector, e.g. direct sickness payments by employers to 
their absent employees as legislated by public authorities, or benefits accruing from mandatory 
contributions to private insurance funds. In some countries public disability benefits (and sometimes 
unemployment benefits) can be supplemented by private benefits with mandatory contributions, 
agreed upon in collective negotiations between employers and employees.  
Voluntary private social expenditure concerns benefits accruing from privately operated programs 
that involve the redistribution of resources across households and include benefits provided by NGOs, 
and benefit accruing from tax advantaged individual plans and collective (often employment-related) 
support arrangements, such as for example, pensions, and, in the US, employment-related health 
plans.  
Table 2 summarizes which expenditures are social and which are not. 
 
Table 2 Categorization of benefits with a social purpose a, b  
 
 Public Private 
 
 Mandatory  Voluntary  Mandatory  Voluntary  
 
Redistribution  
Means-tested 
benefits, social 
insurance benefits  
Voluntary 
participation in public 
insurance programs. 
Self-employed 
‘opting in’ to obtain 
insurance coverage.  
Employer-provided 
sickness benefits, 
benefits accruing 
from mandatory 
contributions, to e.g. 
pension or disability 
insurance.  
Tax-advantaged 
benefits, e.g. 
individual retirement 
accounts, 
occupational 
pensions, employer-
provided health plans  
No redistribution  
Benefits from 
government 
managed individual 
saving schemes  
 
Non tax-advantaged 
actuarially fair 
pension benefits 
Exclusively private: 
Benefits accruing 
from insurance plans 
bought at market 
prices given 
individual 
preferences. 
 
Notes: 
a By definition transfers between individuals, even when of a social nature, are not considered to be within 
the social domain.  
b The shaded cells reflect benefits that are NOT classified as social. 
 
Source: OECD, Social Expenditure database (2007) 
 
 
Table 3 shows public and private social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, for the most recent 
data year 2003. Most social support is publicly provided. In most countries the share of public 
social benefits in total social expenditures exceeds 85 percent. However, the role of private 
arrangements of varying nature in providing close substitutes to public social protection 
expenditure is considerable in some OECD countries. In the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and Korea, the share of private social expenditure is more than 25 percent, while in the 
US this share is almost 40 percent. In most countries private voluntary expenditure are dominant, 
but there are exceptions: mainly in Switzerland mandatory private expenditures are very high. 
Figure 3 shows that in a number of countries private social expenditures have risen quite rapidly 
over the years.  
There may be various explanations for this increase in private social expenditure in various 
countries. Lower public protection may induce private social arrangements of different nature. But 
a shift from public to private provision of social protection can also be an explicit policy objective, 
to alleviate public budgets, or to strengthen incentives in the system. For example, the 
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privatisation of the sickness benefit program in the Netherlands was directed at increasing the 
incentives for employers to reduce the number of beneficiaries. Policy makers may also want to 
realize efficiency gains through a shift from public to private provision, because private providers 
have stronger incentives to reduce costs. Anyway, accounting for private social expenditures is 
important for judging the social effort and the level of social protection in countries.  
 
Table 3: Public and private social expenditure, % GDP, 2003 
 
  
Public 
expenditure 
 
(2) 
Private 
mandatory 
 
(3) 
Private 
voluntary 
 
(4) 
Private 
expenditure 
 
(5)=(3)+(4) 
Total 
expenditure 
 
(6)=(2)+(5) 
Share 
private 
 
(5)/(6)*100 
Australia 17.9 1.2 3.2 4.5 22.4 20% 
Austria 26.1 0.9 1.2 2.1 28.1 7% 
Belgium 26.5 0.0 3.9 3.9 30.4 13% 
Canada 17.3 0.0 5.4 5.4 22.7 24% 
Czech Republic 21.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 21.5 2% 
Denmark 27.6 0.2 2.3 2.5 30.1 8% 
Finland 22.5 3.5 1.2 4.6 27.1 17% 
France 28.7 0.4 2.3 2.7 31.4 8% 
Germany 27.3 1.2 1.8 3.0 30.2 10% 
Greece 21.3 0.0 2.4 2.4 23.7 10% 
Iceland 18.7 5.1 0.0 5.1 23.8 22% 
Ireland 15.9 0.0 0.5 0.5 16.4 3% 
Italy 24.2 1.8 0.5 2.3 26.4 9% 
Japan 17.7 0.7 2.6 3.3 21.0 16% 
Korea 5.7 2.2 0.2 2.4 8.1 29% 
Luxembourg 22.2 2.6 0.1 2.7 24.9 11% 
Mexico 6.8 0.0 0.2 0.2 7.0 3% 
Netherlands 20.7 0.7 7.0 7.7 28.3 27% 
New Zealand 18.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 18.5 2% 
Norway 25.1 1.6 1.0 2.6 27.7 9% 
Poland 22.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 0% 
Portugal 23.5 0.4 1.1 1.5 25.0 6% 
Slovak Republic 17.3 0.2 1.1 1.3 18.6 7% 
Spain 20.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 20.6 2% 
Sweden 31.3 0.6 2.4 3.0 34.3 9% 
Switzerland 20.5 7.2 1.1 8.3 28.8 29% 
United Kingdom 20.6 0.8 6.0 6.8 27.4 25% 
United States 16.2 0.4 9.7 10.0 26.2 38% 
Mean 20.9 1.1 2.1 3.2 24.1 13% 
 
Source: OECD. Social Expenditure database 1980-2003 (www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure); download 
February 26th, 2008; and own calculations. 
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Figure 3: Change in public and private social expenditure 1980-2003, %-points of GDP 
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Note: Countries are ranked in order of their level of private social expenditure in 2003. Note that not all countries 
of Table 3 are plotted in Figure 3, because 1980-data is not available for all countries. 
 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure database 1980-2003 (www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure); download 
February 26th, 2008; and own calculations. 
 
 
But what about the redistributive impact of private social arrangements? It is plausible that the 
redistributive effects of transfers are weaker in countries where programs mostly rely on earnings-
related schemes compared to countries with mostly (public) means-tested provisions of transfers. 
Private insurance schemes are actuarially fair as a rule. Most private insurances are not earnings-
related. Individual private pension insurances, for example, have a defined contribution character, 
and therefore do not contain any elements of (ex ante) income redistribution. Private schemes can 
also have earnings-related benefits. It is sometimes argued that earnings-related social insurance 
benefits only reproduce inequalities in market income and therefore do not redistribute economic 
resources between income segments, in case benefits are perfectly earnings-related and the risk of 
being in receipt of benefit is equally distributed in the population. So, in that case a higher share of 
private social protection will not have any (partial) effect on the distribution of income. However, 
private earnings-related schemes may not be actuarially fair and may contain elements of solidarity. 
This is often the case when (supplementary) private schemes are negotiated by social partners in 
collective labour contracts. These schemes are mandatory for (a group of) workers. Defined benefit 
pension schemes, for example, generally redistribute resources both within generations (for 
instance through redistributive elements such as thresholds or ceilings) and across generations 
(risk sharing, back service). Defined benefit systems for early retirement tend to redistribute to 
members who leave before the official retirement age from those who stay. In fact, as we 
mentioned in the former section, private social programs by definition contain elements of 
interpersonal redistribution.  
Also, tax advantages (to households or to employers) can be used to stimulate the provision of 
private benefits. This is often the case in supplementary pension programs, where contributions are 
tax exempt. The fiscal advantages related to, for example, supplementary private pension plans 
are positively related to income levels in most countries. In general, as Ferrarini and Nelson (2002, 
pp. 14-15) showed, social insurance is less equalising after taxation in all countries.  
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In general, we do expect that private schemes will generate less income redistribution than public 
programs, although at this stage the distributional impact of taking account for private social 
schemes in a cross-country analysis is not fully clear. Private arrangements will likely have less 
redistributional effects compared to public programs. In addition, it is plausible that mainly higher 
income groups will make use of private social schemes (Casey and Yamada, 2002). Considering 
also that private schemes often have favourable tax treatment (deductibility of contributions), 
which benefits the rich, it is possible that private social expenditure has a positive effect on income 
inequality. In other words, we expect income inequality to be relatively high (low) in countries where 
the share of private arrangement in the total social benefits is relatively high (low).  
 
 
4  The link between public/private social protection and income inequality 
 
We performed various cross-county analyses of the relationship between public and private social 
expenditures and the income distribution.2 Obviously, this analysis is not very sophisticated. The 
material presented here is only descriptive and does not explain the household income distribution. 
Such an analysis should ideally be based on a theory, which would have to address at least the 
following cross-national differences (cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000, p. 263): differences in 
labour markets that affect earnings of individual household members; difference in sources of capital 
and in returns to capital; demographic differences, such as the ageing of the population and growth 
of single parent households, which affect both family needs and labour market decisions; and 
differences across countries in tax and transfers policies that not only affect family income directly, 
but also may affect work and investment decisions. Such a comprehensive approach is far beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
In Figure 4 (panel a), we have plotted the average level of public social expenditure as percentage 
of GDP and the average level of the Gini coefficient of disposable income for countries, where both 
data-items are available. Both averages are represented by the cross of both axes: 21.8 percent 
for public expenditures, and 0.292 for the Gini. Several countries show levels in social transfers 
above this average. Other countries combine a below-average level of public social expenditure 
with an above-average level in inequality.  
We find a pretty good fit of a logarithmic OLS-regression with the level of the Gini and the level of 
public social spending as a percentage of GDP (a similar regression is done by Gouyette and 
Pestieau, 1999); see Table 4. Using public expenditure as dependent variable produces the 
expected negative sign, while the coefficient is statistically significant. In other words, we find a 
quite strong negative relationship between public social expenditures and income inequality. 
Obviously, public social security transfers are well-targeted towards the poor.  
The picture alters when we take private social security expenditures into account in our analysis; 
see Figure 4 panel b. A negative relationship between private social expenditures and inequality 
can not be found; indeed the relationship is slightly positive. This is confirmed by a simple 
regression analysis reported in Table 4. The estimated coefficient of private expenditure-variable is 
positive, but not statistically significant. These are indications that support our hypothesis that 
public and private arrangements in social protection do have opposite distributional effects. This 
positive (rather than a negative) sign may reflect that higher income groups find it easier to opt in 
to private social programs. 
                                                 
2  We include 22 countries in our data set on the basis of data availability on both income (re)distribution 
measures and private social expenditure measures: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See the Appendix 
for details. 
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Figure 4: Public and private social expenditure and Gini index of equivalized disposable income 
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Table 4: Impact of public and private social expenditure on income inequality around 2003 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Intercept 
Total 
expenditure 
Public 
expenditure 
Private 
expenditure Adj. R2 
        -0.085 -0.329   0.391 
(1) 
(-0.71) (-3.81)**     
-0.011  -0.401  0.543 
(2) 
(-0.10)  (-5.10)**    
-0.006  -0.405 0.003 0.520 
(3) 
-(0.06)  (-4.80)** (0.17)   
-0.534   -0.024 -0.009 
Gini index net 
disposable income 
(4) 
(-30.95)**     (-0.90)   
 
Notes: Logarithmic OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses.   
** Significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at 0.05 level 
 
Source: OECD (2007), LIS-data based on Brandolini and Smeeding (2005), and own calculations 
 
 
Note that private arrangements mitigate the impact of public social effort on income inequality to 
some extent, although the estimated coefficient of the total expenditure-variable is still negative 
and significant. In an earlier paper with less recent data we found that, as a result of the divergent 
effects of public social expenditure versus private social expenditure, the relationship between total 
social expenditures and income inequality across 16 wealthy countries appeared to be statistically 
trivial (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2005).3 
 
We performed a similar analysis of the relationship between public and private social expenditures 
with the reduction in income inequality caused by income transfers (income redistribution from taxes 
and social benefits as defined in section 2). In Figure 5 panel a the expected relationship is shown: 
countries with a higher level of public social expenditure have more income redistribution or more 
reduction of the Gini. Panel b shows that there is no obvious relationship between private social 
expenditures and income redistribution. This is confirmed by the regression results in Table 5. 
 
                                                 
3 Moreover, we performed another analysis as well and we find similar results in case net rather than gross 
social expenditures are taken into our empirical analysis. However, data on net public and net private social 
expenditures are not (yet) available for Luxembourg, Poland and Switzerland. See the Appendix for details. 
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Figure 5: Public and private social expenditure and the redistribution of income 
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Table 5: Impact of public and private social expenditure on income redistribution around 2003 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Intercept 
Total 
expenditure 
Public 
expenditure 
Private 
expenditure adj. R2 
        -2.734 1.234   0.604 
(1) 
(-9.17)** (5.75)**     
-2.738  1.295  0.605 
(2) 
(-9.17)**  (5.76)**    
-2.620  1.188 0.081 0.633 
(3) 
(-8.81)**  (5.23)** (1.59)   
-1.073   0.159 0.149 
Redistribution:  
(Ginipre – Ginipost)  
(4) 
(-22.03)**     (2.16)*   
 
Notes: Logarithmic OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses.   
** Significant at the 0.01 level; * significant at 0.05 level 
- Gini index of market (pre-government private sector) income: Ginipre 
- Gini index net disposable (post-government) income: Ginipost 
 
Source: OECD (2007), LIS-data based on Brandolini and Smeeding (2005), and own calculations 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
Most analyses of social protection are focussed on public arrangements. But social effort is not 
restricted to the public domain; all kinds of private arrangements can be close substitutes to public 
programs. In fact, OECD-data indicate that in several countries there has been a shift from public 
towards private social arrangements. Private arrangements are considered as ‘social’ when they 
serve a social purpose and when there is some kind of government involvement. Examples are 
supplementary employment-based and tax advantaged pension plans and private health insurance 
plans with legal stipulations. In this contribution we analysed the distributional effects of public and 
private social arrangements. Income redistribution is one of the important objectives of the welfare 
state. In all OECD countries, the social protection system causes a more equal distribution of 
incomes. Taxes and transfers reduce the Gini coefficient by roughly 20 to 50 percent in OECD 
countries. Public pensions have the strongest redistributive impact. Based on cross-country 
regressions, we find a negative relationship between public social expenditures and income 
inequality.  
- 11 - 
However, we expect that private schemes will generate less redistribution from rich to poor. And 
indeed, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between private social expenditures 
and income inequality and income redistribution. Consequently, changes in the public/private mix 
in the provision of social protection may affect the redistributive impact of the welfare state. 
Accounting for private social arrangements matters as far as the distributional impact of the social 
protection system is concerned. 
- 12 - 
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Appendix: Data and correlation tests across countries 
 
Our research hypothesis is that the level of public social expenditure and income inequality across countries are negatively correlated, while private social expenditure may 
have a non-negative redistributional effect. To analyze this hypothesis we include 22 countries in our data set on the basis of data availability on both Income 
(Re)Distribution measures and Private Social Expenditure measures (gross and/or net). For 19 countries all data items are available. For another three countries - 
Luxembourg, Poland and Switzerland - only data of net social expenditure are missing (although data on gross private social expenditure is available), so we put these 
countries also in our data set. As a result we have performed regression analyses with two data sets containing 22 respectively 19 OECD-countries.  
 
Data set 1 Inequality of market income and net disposable income  Gross public and private social expenditure, % GDP, 2003 
              
  
Gini  
market  
income 
Gini  
disposable 
income 
Effect taxes  
and 
transfers  
Redistribution 
measure  
Most 
recent  
data year  Public 
Private 
mandatory 
Private 
voluntary Private Total 
Share 
private 
Most 
recent  
data year 
Australia 0.406 0.311 0.095 23.4% 1994  17.9 1.2 3.2 4.5 22.4 20% 2003 
Austria 0.382 0.260 0.122 31.9% 2000  26.1 0.9 1.2 2.1 28.1 7% 2003 
Belgium 0.343 0.277 0.066 19.2% 2000  26.5 0.0 3.9 3.9 30.4 13% 2003 
Canada 0.391 0.302 0.089 22.8% 2000  17.3 0.0 5.4 5.4 22.7 24% 2003 
Czech Republic 0.338 0.259 0.079 23.4% 1996  21.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 21.5 2% 2003 
Denmark 0.416 0.236 0.180 43.3% 1992  27.6 0.2 2.3 2.5 30.1 8% 2003 
Finland 0.361 0.247 0.114 31.6% 2000  22.5 3.5 1.2 4.6 27.1 17% 2003 
France 0.462 0.288 0.174 37.7% 1994  28.7 0.4 2.3 2.7 31.4 8% 2003 
Germany 0.438 0.252 0.186 42.5% 2000  27.3 1.2 1.8 3.0 30.2 10% 2003 
Ireland 0.381 0.323 0.058 15.2% 2000  15.9 0.0 0.5 0.5 16.4 3% 2003 
Italy 0.427 0.333 0.094 22.0% 2000  24.2 1.8 0.5 2.3 26.4 9% 2003 
Luxembourg 0.352 0.260 0.092 26.1% 2000  22.2 2.6 0.1 2.7 24.9 11% 2003 
Mexico 0.495 0.471 0.024 4.8% 2002  6.8 0.0 0.2 0.2 7.0 3% 2003 
Netherlands 0.357 0.248 0.109 30.5% 1999  20.7 0.7 7.0 7.7 28.3 27% 2003 
Norway 0.408 0.251 0.157 38.5% 2000  25.1 1.6 1.0 2.6 27.7 9% 2003 
Poland 0.378 0.293 0.085 22.5% 1999  22.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 0% 2003 
Slovak Republic 0.303 0.241 0.062 20.5% 1996  17.3 0.2 1.1 1.3 18.6 7% 2003 
Spain 0.354 0.303 0.051 14.4% 1990  20.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 20.6 2% 2003 
Sweden 0.432 0.252 0.180 41.7% 2000  31.3 0.6 2.4 3.0 34.3 9% 2003 
Switzerland 0.358 0.307 0.051 14.2% 1992  20.5 7.2 1.1 8.3 28.8 29% 2003 
United Kingdom 0.506 0.345 0.161 31.8% 1999  20.6 0.8 6.0 6.8 27.4 25% 2003 
United States 0.451 0.368 0.083 18.4% 2000  16.2 0.4 9.7 10.0 26.2 38% 2003 
Number of countries 22 22 22 22   22 22 22 22 22 22  
Average  0.397 0.292 0.105 26.2%   21.8 1.1 2.3 3.4 25.2 12.7%  
 
Source: OECD (2007, www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure), LIS-data based on Brandolini and Smeeding (2005, www.lisproject.org/workshop.htm; and own calculations 
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Data set 2 Inequality of market income and net disposable income  Net public and private social expenditure, % GDP, 2003 
              
  
Gini  
Market  
Income 
Gini  
Disposable 
Income 
Effect taxes  
and transfers  
Redistribution 
Measure  
Most 
recent  
data year  Public 
Private 
mandatory 
Private 
voluntary Private Total 
Share 
private 
Most 
recent  
data year 
Australia 0.406 0.311 0.095 23.4% 1994  17.2 1.0 2.7 3.7 20.9 18% 2003 
Austria 0.382 0.260 0.122 31.9% 2000  20.6 0.5 1.0 1.5 22.2 7% 2003 
Belgium 0.343 0.277 0.066 19.2% 2000  22.9 0.0 3.1 3.1 26.0 12% 2003 
Canada 0.391 0.302 0.089 22.8% 2000  17.2 0.0 4.3 4.3 21.4 20% 2003 
Czech Republic 0.338 0.259 0.079 23.4% 1996  19.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 19.8 2% 2003 
Denmark 0.416 0.236 0.180 43.3% 1992  20.3 0.1 1.2 1.2 21.6 6% 2003 
Finland 0.361 0.247 0.114 31.6% 2000  17.7 2.1 0.7 2.9 20.6 14% 2003 
France 0.462 0.288 0.174 37.7% 1994  25.5 0.3 2.2 2.5 28.0 9% 2003 
Germany 0.438 0.252 0.186 42.5% 2000  25.8 0.6 1.6 2.2 28.0 8% 2003 
Ireland 0.381 0.323 0.058 15.2% 2000  14.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 14.4 3% 2003 
Italy 0.427 0.333 0.094 22.0% 2000  20.6 1.4 0.4 1.9 22.5 8% 2003 
Mexico 0.495 0.471 0.024 4.8% 2002  7.6 0.0 0.2 0.2 7.7 2% 2003 
Netherlands 0.357 0.248 0.109 30.5% 1999  17.9 0.4 5.1 5.6 23.5 24% 2003 
Norway 0.408 0.251 0.157 38.5% 2000  20.2 0.9 0.6 1.5 21.7 7% 2003 
Slovak Republic 0.303 0.241 0.062 20.5% 1996  16.1 0.2 0.9 1.1 17.2 6% 2003 
Spain 0.354 0.303 0.051 14.4% 1990  17.6 0.0 0.3 0.3 18.0 2% 2003 
Sweden 0.432 0.252 0.180 41.7% 2000  24.3 0.3 1.5 1.8 26.1 7% 2003 
United Kingdom 0.506 0.345 0.161 31.8% 1999  19.3 0.6 4.8 5.4 24.7 22% 2003 
United States 0.451 0.368 0.083 18.4% 2000  17.3 0.4 8.9 9.2 26.5 35% 2003 
Number of countries 19 19 19 19   19 19 19 19 19 19  
Average  0.403 0.293 0.110 27.0%   19.0 0.5 2.1 2.6 21.6 11.1%  
 
Source: OECD (2007, www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure), LIS-data based on Brandolini and Smeeding (2005, www.lisproject.org/workshop.htm; and own calculations 
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Correlation tests: Linkage between LIS income distribution measures and gross and net social expenditure among countries around 
2000-2003 
 
 
Gross social expenditure (data set 1) 
  
Net social expenditure (data set 2) 
 
Dependent variable Intercept Total Public Private adj. R2  Intercept Total Public Private adj. R2 
               
-0.085 -0.329   0.391  -0.112 -0.324   0.245 
(-0.71) (-3.81)**      (-0.68) (-2.61)*     
               -0.011  -0.401  0.543  0.022  -0.444  0.414 
(-0.10)  (-5.10)**     (0.15)  (-3.71)**    
               -0.006  -0.405 0.003 0.520  0.094  -0.507 0.033 0.412 
(-0.06)  (-4.80)** (0.17)    (0.55)  (-3.72)** (0.97)   
               -0.534   -0.024 -0.009  -0.534   -0.027 -0.031 
Gini index net disposable 
income: Gini post 
(-30.95)**     (-0.90)    (-26.42)**     (-0.68)   
               
-2.734 1.234   0.604  -2.944 1.464   0.630 
(-9.17)** (5.75)**      (-8.54)** (5.63)**     
               -2.738  1.295  0.605  -3.074  1.628  0.649 
(-9.17)**  (5.76)**     (-8.70)**  (5.86)**    
               -2.620  1.188 0.081 0.633  -2.835  1.420 0.111 0.670 
(-8.81)**  (5.23)** (1.59)    (-7.44)**  (4.64)** (1.43)   
               -1.073   0.159 0.149  -1.075   0.281 0.272 
Redistribution:  
(Gini pre – Gini post)   
(-22.03)**     (2.16)*    (-21.11)**     (2.78)*   
               
-2.380 1.270   0.699  -2.545 1.464   0.671 
(-9.51)** (7.05)**      (-8.05)** (6.14)**     
               -2.424  1.363  0.733  -2.732  1.673  0.733 
(-10.26)**  (7.66)**     (-9.13)**  (7.11)**    
               -2.331  1.279 0.063 0.751  -2.572  1.534 0.074 0.737 
(-9.89)**  (7.11)** (1.57)    (-7.78)**  (5.78)** (1.11)   
               -0.665   0.148 0.135  -0.671   0.258 0.237 
Relative redistribution:  
(Gini pre – Gini post)/ Gini pre   
(-14.07)**     (2.07)    (-13.24)**     (2.57)*   
 
Note: Logarithmic OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses. ** Social expenditure variable significant at 0.01 level; * Social expenditure variable significant at 0.05 level. 
 
Source: OECD (2007, www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure), LIS-data based on Brandolini and Smeeding (2005, www.lisproject.org/workshop.htm; and own calculations 
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